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 MARKETS IN MERGER ANALYSIS 
By Herbert Hovenkamp
*
 
Antitrust merger policy suffers from a disconnect between its articulated concerns and the 
methodologies it employs.  The Supreme Court has largely abandoned the field of horizontal 
merger analysis, leaving us with ancient decisions that have never been overruled but whose 
fundamental approach has been ignored or discredited.  Only within the last generation has 
econometrics developed useful techniques for estimating the price impact of specific mergers in 
differentiated markets.  Although the Supreme Court’s Brown Shoe decision required a market 
definition, the Court was not thinking of a relevant market as a grouping of sales capable of 
being monopolized or cartelized.  The perceived injury in Brown Shoe was not collusion, but 
rather that the postmerger firm would acquire a competitive advantage over its competitors.  
Indeed, Brown Shoe was a “unilateral effects” case in the sense that its concern was with the 
likelihood that the postmerger firm would be able to undersell other firms within the same 
market. 
I. MERGER POLICY, STRUCTURALISM, AND THE LEGACY OF BROWN 
SHOE 
The policy articulated in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the 2010 Guidelines) is that 
mergers should not be permitted to create, enhance, or entrench market power or to 
facilitate its exercise. For simplicity of exposition, these Guidelines generally refer to all 
of these effects as enhancing market power. A merger enhances market power if it is 
likely to encourage one or more firms to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, 
or otherwise harm customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or 
incentives.
1
 
                                            
*
 Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.   
AUTHOR’S NOTE:  The position offered here differs in some respects from ones I have taken 
in the Antitrust Law treatise.  Although the treatise recognizes that alternatives to market 
definition can be superior when satisfactory data are available, and that traditional market 
definition approaches are never particularly accurate and often unhelpful, particularly when 
products are differentiated, it is nevertheless a book written for lawyers and reflects as best it can 
the ruling case law, in which the need for market definition dominates.  This is particularly true 
of rule of reason and merger analysis.  See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 515, 521 (3d ed. 2007).  See also Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define 
Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 479 n.80 (2010). But see Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. 
Simons, In Defense of Market Definition (Working Paper, Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1967208 (market definition is inherent in the 
process and even direct measures must assume a benchmark measured by identifying the firms to 
which customers can realistically substitute). 
1
 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §1 (2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html [hereinafter 2010 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945964
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This language is certainly consistent with the “may . . . substantially lessen competition” 
of  section 7 of the Clayton Act.
2
  The statute does not speak about altering market structures, 
raising prices, reducing output, facilitating exclusionary practices, restraining innovation, or any 
other specific conception of reducing competition.  It plausibly encompasses all.  The phrase 
“otherwise harm customers” in the 2010 Guidelines suggests a dominant concern for consumers.  
This suggests that merger policy should be focused on high prices and at least occasionally on 
mergers that restrain innovation.
3
 
Modern American merger policy has evolved out of an era that was guided by two 
principles.  Both are at odds with the most fundamental principles of antitrust policy today.  The 
first principle, highly influential in the economic literature of the 1960s, was structuralism, which 
found a close link between economic performance and market structure.  Under this view, 
controlling anticompetitive behavior was all about controlling market structure so as to eliminate 
either monopoly or oligopoly.
4
  The second principle, popular in the legal literature and political 
dialogue of the same period, was that merger policy must protect smaller rivals from larger 
firms, even at consumers’ expense.  Antitrust policy has for the most part abjured both of these 
positions.  The successive editions of the Merger Guidelines have clearly rejected the second and 
increasingly distanced themselves from the first.
5
  Nevertheless, our analytic tools have not 
entirely kept up, and a reader can detect significant differences of opinion even within the 
Agencies. 
The market definition requirement in merger cases has evolved within this history.
6
  The 
modern conceptions of product and geographic market definition were formulated in mid-
twentieth century decisions such as Alcoa,
7
 Columbia Steel,
8
 du Pont,
 9
 Brown Shoe,
10
 
                                                                                                                                            
GUIDELINES].  These Guidelines are issued jointly by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust 
Division and the Federal Trade Commission.  The word “Agencies” herein describes both. 
2
 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
3
 On the 2010 Guidelines’ treatment of mergers that may restraint innovation, see Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Harm to Competition under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. 
INDUS. ORG. 3 (2011).  On innovation restraints, see CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:  PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN 
INNOVATION, ch. 9 (2012). 
4
See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 311 (2009); Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduction to the Neal Report and the Crisis in 
Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 219, 219–22 (2009). 
5
 The Justice Department and later the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission jointly 
issued Merger Guidelines in 1968, 1982 (revised in 1984), 1992 (revised in 1997), and 2010. All 
can be found at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/significant-guidance.html. 
6
  On the governing case law, including all Supreme Court and lower court decisions, see 2B 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 530–566 (3d ed. 2007). 
7
 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
8
 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). 
9
 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
10
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945964
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Philadelphia National Bank,
11
 and Continental Can,
12
 at a time when market structure was 
thought to count for a great deal, and one could not assess structure without defining a market.
13
  
As Kaysen and Turner put it in their seminal book Antitrust Policy in 1959, the “central aim” of 
antitrust should be “the elimination and prevention of unreasonable market power,” and the only 
way to do this was to “delimit . . . the market and get . . . a usable measure of the market share . . 
. .”
14
 
 The actual text of the merger statute is much less explicit.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
condemns mergers whose effect may be substantially to lessen competition or create a monopoly 
“in any line of commerce” and “in any section of the country.”
15
  Although section 7 was 
amended in important respects in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver Act, these two phrases were 
similar to language contained in the original 1914 version of section 7.
16
  The 1950s amendments 
were passed partly in reaction to the Supreme Court’s Columbia Steel decision, which had 
declined to condemn a merger mainly for reasons having to do with market definition.  The 
Court used the term “relevant market” to describe the geographic market in that decision, and the 
word “product” to describe the product market.
17
  Columbia Steel was the first time that the 
Supreme Court or any other federal court had used the term “relevant market” in a merger case, 
although it had used the term “line of commerce.”
18
  The Court did not have occasion to use the 
                                            
11
 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963). 
12
 United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). 
13
 See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND 
CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION (1959); CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY:  AN 
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959); EDWARD S. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND 
THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM (1957). 
14 KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 13, at 100–01. 
15
 15 U.S.C. §18 (2012). 
16
The riginal Clayton Act provision provided that: 
 
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or 
any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in 
commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen 
competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation 
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or 
tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce. 
38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (emphasis added). 
17
 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 508, 509 (1948).  Even the well known 
discussion of market definition in Judge Hand’s decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), spoke only of the “market”; it never used the terms 
“relevant market,” “geographic market,” or “product market,” even though the decision contains 
lengthy discussions of all of those issues.  
18
 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303, 326 (1948).  See also Gregory J. 
Werden, Next Steps in the Evolution of Antitrust Law: What to Expect from the Roberts Court, J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 5, 61–62 (2009); Gregory J. Werden, Simulating Unilateral 
Competitive Effects from Differentiated Products Mergers, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 11, 27. 
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terms contained in  section 7 of the Clayton Act because the Columbia Steel action had been 
brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The case involved an asset acquisition, and prior to 
the 1950 amendments  section 7 reached only stock acquisitions.
19
  However, the Supreme Court 
stated that the policies articulated in section 7 of the Clayton Act must be “taken into account” in 
applying the Sherman Act to a merger.
20
 
 When it drafted the phrases “line of commerce” and “section or community” in 1914, and 
even when it restated them as “section of the country” in 1950, Congress almost certainly did not 
have a technical definition of “relevant market” in mind.  The phrase “line of commerce” was 
very commonly used in commercial law and other settings to describe a particular “line” of 
business, or a set of products that a layperson might regard as in the same “line,” such as clothing 
or groceries.  For example, referring to the pigment industry, the Supreme Court stated in 1875 
that oxides and zinc are “staples of trade in that line of commerce.”
21
  Business of a certain type, 
such as women’s clothing or groceries, was commonly referred to as a “line.”  Thus courts 
interpreted commercial contracts by looking to customs and usages of trade in that “line of 
commerce.”
22
  A “line of commerce” could certainly include competing products, but it could 
also include complements that are ordinarily sold together.  As a general matter complements are 
not in the same relevant market, except in a few cases in which they also function as substitutes 
or in which transaction cost savings give an aggregation a cost advantage over independent 
sales.
23
 
 The 1914 phrase “section or community” and the 1950 phrase “section of the country” 
were intended to create jurisdictional limits, not to define an economic geographic market.  
Mainly, Congress wanted to make sure that the Clayton Act’s reach would be limited to mergers 
whose impact was felt in the United States rather than abroad, thus giving it a somewhat 
narrower reach than the Sherman Act’s application to combinations “in restraint of trade or 
                                            
19
 FTC v. W. Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926); Milton Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-
Trust Laws, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 179, 266 (1932); and Comment, Corporate Consolidation and 
the Concentration of Economic Power:  Proposals for Revitalization of Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act, 57 YALE L.J. 613 (1948) (summarizing earlier proposals to extend section 7’s reach to asset 
acquisitions). 
20
 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 507 & n.7 (1948). 
21
 Meyer v. Arthur, 91 U.S. 570, 573 (1875).  See also Bowles v. Gulf Ref. Co., 61 F. Supp. 149 
(D. Ohio 1945) (provisions of Emergency Price Control act designed not to affect the way that 
business is conducted in any particular “line of commerce”). 
22
 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Citizens’ Nat’l Bank of Chickasha, 61 Okla. 112, 160 P. 635 (Okla. 1916) 
(contract interpretation depends upon the customs or usage of trade of “those engaged in that line 
of commerce”); Dixon v. Dunham, 14 Ill. 324, 324 (1853) (a usage of trade that is indispensable 
in a particular “line of commerce” is an allowable interpretation); Mobile Fruit & Trading Co. v. 
J.H. Judy & Son., 91 Ill. App. 82 at 90 (1900) (“The rule is well recognized that where a 
commercial contract is in any respect ambiguous, and the necessities of the particular line of 
commerce render a particular custom or usage so indispensably necessary as to commend itself,” 
that usage will be presumed.). 
23
 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 565a. 
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commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations . . . .
24
  For example, original section 
2 of the Clayton Act, which condemned a form of predatory pricing, reached only commodities 
destined for use, sale or consumption in the United States.
25
  Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which 
reached tying and exclusive dealing, contained a similar limitation.
26
   The phrase “in any section 
or community” contained in the 1914 version of section 7 was changed to “section of the 
country” in 1950 largely because Congress was concerned about anticompetitive effects only in 
the United States.
27
 
As noted above, in 1948 Columbia Steel had used the term “relevant market,” and the 
1950 Celler-Kefauver revisions to the merger statute heavily targeted that decision.  As a result it 
is far from obvious that Congress intended to write the term “relevant market” into the language 
that it chose, and there is at least as much reason for thinking that it wished to avoid that 
inference.  In his provocative and widely cited 1960 article on the Celler-Kefauver amendments, 
Derek Bok gave no analysis to the “line of commerce” and “section of the country” language.  
Nevertheless, he appeared to assume throughout that merger policy required an assessment of 
competitive consequences based on shares of a relevant market, a term that he used numerous 
times.
28
 
Brown Shoe was the Supreme Court’s first application of the 1950 amendments of 
section 7 to a horizontal (as well as vertical) merger.  It was also the Court’s first equation of the 
1950 Act’s phrases “line of commerce” and “section of the country” with product and 
geographic markets.  The Supreme Court stated quite categorically that “[t]he ‘area of effective 
competition’ must be determined by reference to a product line (the ‘line of commerce’) and a 
geographic market (the ‘section of the country’).”
29
  It also stated that: 
                                            
24
 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
25
 See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) 38 Stat. 730 (Oct. 15, 1914)  (“where either or any of the purchases 
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, 
consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of 
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States . . . 
.” ). 
26
 15 U.S.C. §14 (2012) (“for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any 
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the 
jurisdiction of the United States . . . .”). 
27
 See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966): 
The language of this section requires merely that the Government prove the merger 
may have a substantial anticompetitive effect somewhere in the United States—
“in any section” of the United States . . . . Proof of the section of the country where the 
anticompetitive effect exists is entirely subsidiary to the crucial question in this and 
every § 7 case which is whether a merger may substantially lessen competition anywhere 
in the United States. 
Id. at 549–50. 
28
 Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. 
L. REV. 226, 250, 309–10 (1960). 
29
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962). 
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Congress neither adopted nor rejected specifically any particular tests for measuring the 
relevant markets, either as defined in terms of product or in terms of geographic locus of 
competition, within which the anti-competitive effects of a merger were to be judged.
30
 
And also: 
[d]etermination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation 
of the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly must be one which will substantially 
lessen competition “within the area of effective competition.” Substantiality can be 
determined only in terms of the market affected.
31
 
As well as: 
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable 
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and 
substitutes for it.  However, within this broad market, well defined submarkets may exist 
which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.
32
 
 These statements are among the most quoted in the antitrust lexicon.  They retain vitality 
even though many other aspects of Brown Shoe have been either rejected or ignored—in 
particular, its making of market shares virtually dispositive, its willingness to condemn both the 
horizontal and the vertical merger on very small market shares, its identification of “submarkets” 
as alternative relevant markets,
33
 and its concern about the postmerger firm’s ability to 
underprice rivals or produce a better product.  Today Brown Shoe’s fundamental approach to 
merger analysis is either rejected or ignored by the lower courts.  Nevertheless, prevailing 
opinion continues to give full precedential regard for Brown Shoe’s insistence on a market 
definition.
34
 
Further, the rationale for market definition in Brown Shoe was very different from, and 
isfundamentally at odds with, the rationale for market definition in horizontal merger cases 
today.   When Chief Justice Warren wrote the above quoted statements about “relevant market” 
for the Supreme Court he was not thinking of a relevant market in terms of a “hypothetical 
monopolist” or an “ideal collusive group,” or as a grouping of sales for which prices could 
profitably and durably be raised above the competitive level.
35
  The perceived injury in Brown 
Shoe was manifestly not that the merger threatened higher shoe prices resulting from increased 
concentration in the shoe market—thus benefitting rivals but harming customers.  Rather, his 
concern was precisely the opposite—namely, that postmerger Brown Shoe would acquire a 
competitive advantage over its competitors.  
                                            
30
 Id. at 320–21. 
31
 Id. at 324 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), a 
vertical merger case). 
32
 Id. at 325 (quoting du Pont, 353 U.S. at 593–95). 
33
 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 533. 
34
 See, e.g., FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying Brown Shoe’s 
relevant market approach in merger case). 
35
 On the development of these definitions of a relevant market see ¶ 530 at 226. 
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 The district court decision that the Supreme Court affirmed was categorical on this issue: 
The testimony in this case further shows that independent retailers of shoes are having a 
harder and harder time in competing with company-owned and company-controlled retail 
outlets. National advertising by large concerns has increased their brand name 
acceptability and retail stores handling the brand named shoes have a definite advertising 
advantage. Company-owned and company-controlled retail stores have definite 
advantages in buying and credit; they have further advantages in advertising, insurance, 
inventory control and assists and price control. These advantages result in lower prices or 
in higher quality for the same price and the independent retailer can no longer compete in 
the low and medium-priced fields and has been driven to concentrate his business in the 
higher-priced, higher-quality type of shoes—and, the higher the price, the smaller the 
market.
36
 
 The government took the same position in its brief to the Supreme Court, signed by 
Solicitor General Archibald Cox: 
[T]he integration of manufacturer-retailer Brown with the large Kinney retail 
organization will seriously aggravate the difficulties that independent retailers are already 
having in competing with the substantial and ever-expanding retail chains. The 
manufacturer-owned or controlled retail outlet can sell its own product at a significantly 
lower price than the non-integrated independent retailer can obtain for a comparable 
product . . . .  The conclusion was inevitable that the advantages the merged company 
would have over its smaller retailing competitors would be so great as to threaten to 
become decisive.
37
 
 
 The Supreme Court itself was only a little more qualified.  Speaking of the horizontal 
effects of that merger at the retail level it wrote: 
in this fragmented industry, even if the combination controls but a small share of a 
particular market, the fact that this share is held by a large national chain can adversely 
affect competition. Testimony in the record from numerous independent retailers, based 
                                            
36
 United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (D. Mo. 1959), aff'd, 370 U.S. 294 
(1962).  See also id. at 739–40: 
 
The Court further finds from the evidence that due to the nature of the shoe industry, no 
one manufacturer, no one retailer, no one manufacturer-retailer combined, has a large 
percentage of the market, wholesale or retail. Yet, a small group of firms control a 
sizeable segment of the market. These firms definitely set the price and style trends. 
These firms are better able to meet the style trends and finance the change over. These 
firms are better able to acquire company owned stores and thus acquire ready-made 
markets for their production. These firms are better able to meet the changing conditions 
of the retail markets and to dominate the mass market in the low and medium priced 
fields. 
37
 Brief for the United States at 48, Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294 (No. 4), 1961 WL 101890. 
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on their actual experience in the market, demonstrates that a strong, national chain of 
stores can insulate selected outlets from the vagaries of competition in particular 
locations and that the large chains can set and alter styles in footwear to an extent that 
renders the independents unable to maintain competitive inventories. A third significant 
aspect of this merger is that it creates a large national chain which is integrated with a 
manufacturing operation. The retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating 
wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the manufacturing division 
of the enterprise, can market their own brands at prices below those of competing 
independent retailers. Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain 
operations are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered unlawful by the 
mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely affected. It is competition, not 
competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to 
promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned business. 
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the 
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing 
considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give effect to that decision.
38
 
 In sum, although the Supreme Court insisted on a market definition, it did so for a 
purpose very different from the one used in merger analysis today.  To be sure, in a horizontal 
merger case it is still important to know where output movements are threatened among the 
postmerger firm and its competitors, but the movement contemplated in Brown Shoe was in the 
opposite direction from what we consider now.  Today the concern is that the postmerger firm 
might be able to raise prices without causing too much output to be lost to its rivals.  In contrast, 
the Brown Shoe concern was that by reducing its price (or improving quality at the same price) 
the postmerger firm could deprive rivals of output, thus forcing them out altogether or relegating 
them to niche markets. 
 As a rough approximation, the boundaries of such a market might be about the same as 
the boundaries of a relevant market under today’s definitions.  When one takes more dynamic 
considerations into account, however, there are fundamental differences.  For example, the focus 
on excess capacity in merger cases today typically examines excess capacity held by the 
postmerger firms’ rivals to see if their output increase will offset the postmerger firm’s 
anticipated output reduction.
39
  By contrast, under the Brown Shoe rationale one might want to 
see if the postmerger firm has sufficient excess capacity so as to be able to steal sales from 
smaller rivals.  Under modern analysis in product differentiated markets, we want to know 
whether rivals will be able to reposition themselves closer to the postmerger firm, thus 
increasing competitive pressures on it.
40
  By contrast, under the Brown Shoe analysis rival firms 
configure themselves away from the postmerger firm in order to avoid competing with it on 
                                            
38
 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 343–44 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), did not return to the issue.  There the 
Court held mainly that the statistical evidence based on current market share exaggerated the 
competitive significance of the postmerger firm. 
39
 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE §§ 3.5–3.7 (4th ed. 2011). 
40
 See discussion infra text at notes __. 
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price.  Indeed, this concern that smaller rivals would be forced to reposition themselves into 
niche markets played an important part in the litigation.
41
 
Further, under the modern analysis that identifies express or tacit collusion as the feared 
harm, the merger tends to affect all of the firms in the market the same way.  That is, if the 
merger tends to make collusion or interdependent pricing more likely, the nonmerging firms will 
benefit as well as the merging firms, and price will increase across the market.  In very sharp 
contrast, the analysis in Brown Shoe saw the postmerger firm as benefiting at the expense of 
nonmerging rivals in the same market.  In this sense Brown Shoe was very much a “unilateral 
effects” case—the benefits of the merger accrued to Brown Shoe alone. 
 Further, today’s merger concern with price increases as opposed to price reductions 
makes relevant a new set of questions that were simply not within the purview of Brown Shoe—
namely, what are the effects of a merger between relatively adjacent firms in a product 
differentiated market.
42
 
 Much of the current critique of the 2010 Guidelines’ de-emphasis on market definition 
seems to be based on the view that Brown Shoe requires such a definition, which it clearly does.  
But then the critiques read back into that definition several decades of antitrust analysis of 
market definition for purposes of assessing the threat of postmerger price increases, as if this is 
what Brown Shoe had in mind all along.  The shift away from Brown Shoe’s conception of a 
relevant market toward one in which the concern is mainly with higher prices occurred largely in 
the 1982/1984 and the 1992 Guidelines, in which market definition based on the hypothetical 
monopolist dominated the methodology.
43
  The 1992 Guidelines hinted at a shift toward 
                                            
41
 See Brief for the United States, supra note 37, at 48 (“The independent retailer, unable to 
compete in the low and medium-priced fields in which vertical integration is most pronounced is, 
the court found, being driven increasingly to concentrate in the declining market for higher-
priced, higher-quality shoes.”); id. at  49 (“The end result, as the court found . . ., has been to 
force increasing numbers of independents to seek refuge in a higher retail price bracket, leaving 
the expanding market for lower and medium priced shoes to the manufacturer-owned outlets.”). 
42
 The concern showed up in some cases involving “product extension” or “market extension” 
mergers.  Although some of these involved complementary products, others involved products 
whose relationship was better classified as competitive rather than complementary but the 
amount of existing competition between the firms was thought to be too small to warrant 
inclusion of the second firm’s output in the relevant market.  See, e.g., United States v. El Paso 
Natural Gas, 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (merger extending firm’s reach into different geographic area).  
A case that involved complements rather than imperfect substitutes is FTC v. Procter & Gamble 
Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577–78 (1967).  One of the difficulties of the merger analysis of these 
nonhorizontal mergers is that it tended to lump together situations in which the products were 
imperfect competitors and those in which they were not competing at all but rather were 
complements. 
43
 The 1968 Guidelines, issued when Donald F. Turner was head of the Antitrust Division, were 
much more ambiguous but clearly expressed at least some concern for higher prices.  Speaking 
of fundamental merger concerns, the 1968 Guidelines declared that: 
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alternative methodologies in which traditional market definition would play a diminished role, 
and thereafter the Agencies increasingly used such methodologies.  The 2010 Guidelines merely 
acknowledged a change in approach for a large subset of mergers that had to a considerable 
degree already occurred within the enforcement Agencies.
44
 
 Those who would roll the clock back to Brown Shoe almost certainly do not mean to 
return to an era in which the purpose of market definition was to see who would be injured by 
the postmerger firm’s more efficient production and pricing.
45
  They largely agree with the 
merger policy of the last two generations, even though it is completely inimical to the policy 
reflected in the Brown Shoe decision.  Nevertheless, they also want to adhere to Brown Shoe’s 
insistence on a market definition. 
II. MARKET DEFINITION, COLLUSIVE GROUPS, AND MARKET-WIDE HARM 
                                                                                                                                            
a concentrated market structure, where a few firms account for a large share of the sales, 
tends to discourage vigorous price competition by the firms in the market and to 
encourage other kinds of conduct, such as use of inefficient methods of production or 
excessive promotional expenditures, of an economically undesirable nature . . . .  
Accordingly, the Department's enforcement activity under Section 7 is directed primarily 
toward the identification and prevention of those mergers which alter market structure in 
ways likely now or eventually to encourage or permit non-competitive conduct. 
 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES § 2, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf.   
The 1968 Guidelines then defined a relevant market as: 
 
a grouping of sales (or other commercial transactions) in which each of the firms whose 
sales are included enjoys some advantage in competing with those firms whose sales are 
not included. The advantage need not be great, for so long as it is significant it defines an 
area of effective competition among the included sellers in which the competition of the 
excluded sellers is, ex hypothesi, less effective. 
Id. § 3. 
44
 See Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty 
Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 728 (2010); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Choosing 
Among Tools for Assessing Unilateral Merger Effects (Vanderbilt L. & Econ.  Research Paper, 
2011), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1804243); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 
Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 
B.E.J. THEORETICAL ECON., Jan. 2010, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art9; Joseph J. Simons & Malcolm B. Coate, Upward 
Pressure on Price Analysis: Issues and Implications for Merger Policy, 6 EUR. COMPETITION 
REV. 377 (2010); Roy J. Epstein & Daniel L, Rubinfeld, Understanding UPP, B.E.J. 
THEORETICAL ECON., Jan. 2010, available at http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art21. 
45
 E.g., James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, “Tally Ho!” UPP and the 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 587 (2011); Keith N. Hylton, Brown Shoe Versus the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 95 (2011). 
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 One statement in Brown Shoe remains highly relevant–namely, its observation that 
Congress “neither adopted nor rejected specifically any particular tests for measuring relevant 
markets.”
46
  Those challenging a merger need to be able to identify a grouping of sales in which 
the feared harm to competition is likely to occur.  Nothing in Brown Shoe indicates that the 
“relevant market” query must show a threat to market-wide price increases.  Indeed, the feared 
consequence in Brown Shoe was benefits for Brown Shoe and burdens for its rivals, all of whom 
were assumed be in the same relevant market; indeed, the fact that they competed was the source 
of their injuries.  The idea that the market analysis requires relatively homogeneous market-wide 
harm is largely an afterthought produced by the collusive group or hypothetical monopolist 
notions of markets that has been tacked on in subsequent analysis, whose approach to market 
definition is fundamentally at odds with the approach taken in Brown Shoe. 
Given its conception of the goals of merger policy, Brown Shoe itself was all about 
“unilateral effects,” not about express or tacit collusion.  That is to say, its concern was not with 
collusive price increases or some other impact that would be uniformly felt across the entire 
market.  Rather, it was that Brown Shoe would be able to profit at the expense of other firms in 
the market.  In a collusion-facilitating merger the price increases benefit all of the firms in the 
market and victimize consumers.  By contrast, in a unilateral effects case the benefits are more 
heterogeneous, extending mainly or perhaps even exclusively to the postmerger firm.
47
  In sum, 
Brown Shoe gives at least as much support for a unilateral effects theory of merger analysis as it 
does for the view that merger policy should be designed so as to minimize the risk of postmerger 
collusive practices. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF MARKET HETEROGENEITY 
It is well known that the relevant market estimates we use for evaluating mergers under 
traditional collusion-facilitating criteria are never “correct” in product differentiated markets or 
in those that have significant spatial dispersion and relatively high transportation costs.
48
  
Inclusion of an imperfect rival results in understatement of anticompetitive effects, while 
exclusion results in overstating them.  Further, there are no good intermediate positions; firms 
are either “in” the market, which means that they are counted as perfect competitors, or else they 
are “out,” which means that they are not counted at all.  Here, econometric measures of 
competition have a strong comparative advantage, assuming that the data needed to implement 
them are available.
49
  Further, nearly all mergers subject to challenge occur in imperfectly 
competitive markets. 
                                            
46
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320–21 (1962).   The full passage is quoted 
supra note 30. 
47
 See discussion infra text at notes. 
48
 Making this point very forcefully is Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 437 (2010).  See also HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 3.6a. 
49
 See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 4.1.3 (“When the necessary data are available, the 
Agencies also may consider a ‘critical loss analysis’ to assess the extent to which it corroborates 
inferences drawn from the evidence noted above.”).  See also Dennis W. Carlton, Revising the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 619, 643 (2010) (noting some of 
the difficulties in obtaining and interpreting data); and Malcolm B. Coate, Unilateral Effects 
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 The approaches that the government Agencies currently use have considerable value 
when a merger occurs between an acquiring firm and another firm that is not its closest 
substitute.  To illustrate, direct empirical estimates of demand responses might indicate that a 
price increase will cost premerger firm Alpha 100 units of output.  Further, these diverted units 
will go, respectively, 40 units to Beta, 30 units to Gamma, 20 units to Delta, and the remaining 
10 units to a number of more remote firms.  This conclusion suggests that Beta is the closest to 
Alpha in product or geographic space, Gamma is second closest and so on.  To say that two firms 
are “closer” means that customers are likely to find them to be closer substitutes.  If the output of 
two firms is perfectly competitive, then customers are completely indifferent between the two 
and will switch entirely to one firm in response to the other firm’s unmatched price increase.  In 
the example, a merger between Alpha and Beta might raise the postmerger firm’s profit-
maximizing price by a specified amount, a merger between Alpha and Gamma by a somewhat 
smaller amount, and so on.
50
  Significantly, however, analysis of pricing responses might show 
that both the Beta and Gamma mergers will produce price increases that are unacceptably high.
51
  
Further, in response to an Alpha-Gamma merger, Beta might raise its price, lower it, or do 
nothing at all. 
 Note that this approach identifies a “grouping of sales” in which the feared price increase 
would occur—namely Alpha and Gamma.  It does not produce a conclusion that the effects will 
be more or less the same on all firms in the market.  As noted above, however, Brown Shoe never 
assessed that requirement either.  Rather, it required only that there be a showing of a “line of 
commerce” in which the feared effect would occur.  Brown Shoe assumed that some sellers in 
the market would benefit, namely the postmerger firm, while rivals within the market would be 
injured. 
 The 2010 Guidelines’ approach to market definition is both clear and fully defensible 
under Brown Shoe standards: 
When the Agencies identify a potential competitive concern with a horizontal 
merger, market definition plays two roles. First, market definition helps specify the line 
of commerce and section of the country in which the competitive concern arises . . . . 
Second, market definition allows the Agencies to identify market participants and 
measure market shares and market concentration . . . .  The measurement of market 
shares and market concentration is not an end in itself, but is useful to the extent it 
illuminates the merger’s likely competitive effects. 
The Agencies’ analysis need not start with market definition. Some of the 
analytical tools used by the Agencies to assess competitive effects do not rely on market 
                                                                                                                                            
Analysis and the Upward Pricing Pressure Model: Evidence from the Federal Trade 
Commission (June 1, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1837645 (analyzing enforcement data at 
FTC). 
50
 Whether the Beta acquisition produces a larger price increase than the Gamma acquisition also 
depends on the acquired firms margins.  See discussion infra text at notes.  
51
 See discussion infra text at notes __. 
Hovenkamp                                            Markets in Merger Analysis                    Aug. 2012, Page 13    
 
definition, although evaluation of competitive alternatives available to customers is 
always necessary at some point in the analysis. 
Evidence of competitive effects can inform market definition, just as market 
definition can be informative regarding competitive effects. For example, evidence that a 
reduction in the number of significant rivals offering a group of products causes prices 
for those products to rise significantly can itself establish that those products form a 
relevant market. Such evidence also may more directly predict the competitive effects of 
a merger, reducing the role of inferences from market definition and market shares. 
Where analysis suggests alternative and reasonably plausible candidate markets, and 
where the resulting market shares lead to very different inferences regarding competitive 
effects, it is particularly valuable to examine more direct forms of evidence concerning 
those effects.
52
 
This language is absolutely consistent with Brown Shoe’s requirement that a market definition is 
essential for identifying the appropriate line of commerce and section of the country in which 
competition is threatened, but that the government has discretion about its choice of 
methodology for producing that conclusion.  Most importantly, a showing that a merger may 
“substantially lessen competition” drives the market analysis, and not the other way around. 
IV. THE CONCERNS OF MERGER POLICY: CONCENTRATION OR PRICES? 
 Today there is little dispute about the proposition that the central concern of merger 
policy is to protect consumers from high prices that result from reduced output.  As Lou Kaplow 
suggests, a useful set of Merger Guidelines consistent with current merger policy would relate 
illegality to price increases.
53
  For example, we might condemn a merger that threatens any price 
increase at all—a proposition that is suggested by the 2010 Guidelines’ efficiency defense 
statement that such defenses will be accepted only if they are sufficient to reduce the expected 
price to the premerger level.
54
  However, in its general analysis of collusion-facilitating mergers 
the 2010 Guidelines tag illegality to various concentration levels measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) and not to presumptive price increases.  Increases in HHI correlate with 
price increases only in the grossest sense.
55
  This seems peculiar to say the least. 
 There are several explanations for this disconnect between merger analysis and 
articulated merger goals.  First, the reigning Supreme Court analysis of horizontal mergers has 
                                            
52
 2010 GUIDELINES supra note 1, § 4.0. 
53
 See Louis Kaplow, Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 107, 
122–23 (2011). 
54
 See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 10 (“The Agencies will not challenge a merger if 
cognizable efficiencies are of a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be 
anticompetitive in any relevant market.  To make the requisite determination, the Agencies 
consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s 
potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that 
market.”). 
55
 See discussion infra text at notes. 
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focused heavily on concentration and market shares, largely to the exclusion of all other 
measures of competitive harm, including price increases.  This is true in large measure because 
the Supreme Court has never articulated a coherent conception of the “may substantially lessen 
competition” standard.  Philadelphia National Bank made market concentration statistics largely 
decisive,
56
 and General Dynamics qualified that only to the extent of stating that market share 
numbers can be misleading when markets are not well defined or a market share statistic is an 
unrealistic indicator of a firm’s competitive significance.
57
  However, even the General 
Dynamics concern was not stated in terms of prices.  Rather, it was that current market shares 
might exaggerate future market shares when a firm’s reserves are largely depleted.  Merger price 
effects was not an important part of the discussion in any of these cases, except for the 
suggestions in Brown Shoe that low prices injuring smaller rivals were the evil to be avoided.
58
 
A second problem is that the Supreme Court has largely abandoned the field of horizontal 
merger analysis, leaving us with a set of decisions that have never been overruled but whose 
fundamental ideology has been broadly ignored or discredited.  General Dynamics, its most 
recent decision reaching the merits, was decided in 1974, approaching forty years ago.  The 
unsatisfactory result leaves both courts and enforcers in the position of having a set of merger 
concerns that claim broad assent—namely, to prevent consumer harm through higher prices—but 
that must constantly be “managed” so as to make them fit into a wholly inconsistent framework 
commanded by these outdated Supreme Court decisions. 
 Third, only within the last generation or so has econometrics developed useful techniques 
for estimating the price impact of specific mergers in differentiated markets.  The HHI as used in 
the Merger Guidelines was the predominant tool for assessing anticompetitive effects from the 
1970s through the early 1990s.  The orthodox conception of the HHI related market structure to a 
Cournot theory of oligopoly on the assumptions (1) that the firms were engaging in persistent 
Cournot behavior (that is, reacting against rivals by setting output rather than price), and (2) that 
the output of the firms in the market was undifferentiated.
59
  Both of those assumptions were 
heroic to say the least.  In 1964, George J. Stigler usefully recast the HHI as a device for 
predicting cartel stability, which arguably made the index useful across a wider range of 
behavioral assumptions but also reduced its usefulness as a meter of price increases.
60
 
                                            
56
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963) (postmerger market share of thirty 
percent and an increase in the share of the two largest banks from forty-four percent to fifty-nine 
percent “raise an inference” of competitive harm). 
57
United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497–98 (1974). 
58
 See discussion supra text at notes ___. 
59
 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39,  § 12.4a2. 
60
 See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964), reprinted in GEORGE 
J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968) (showing both how the HHI is derived from 
a pure Cournot theory of oligopoly and how the HHI might be useful even on relaxed Cournot 
assumptions as a device for predicting cartel stability).  For refinements, see Edward J. Green & 
Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, 52 
ECONOMETRICA 87 (1984); Jonathan B. Baker, Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of 
Horizontal Mergers, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 234, 252 & nn.20–21 (Keith N. 
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At best a poor correlation exists between concentration, changes in concentration in a 
defined market, and price increases from Cournot oligopoly or more explicit forms of collusion.  
The market definition approach that use of the HHI entails forces analysts to place firms either 
inside or outside the market, recognizing no intermediate degrees of competitiveness.  Second, 
once such markets are defined they tend to be treated alike, even though the price impact of a 
merger can vary enormously among different markets with exactly the same HHI numbers 
depending on variations in elasticity of demand—an observation that Landes and Posner made 
thirty years ago.
61
  And this is true even if the product is completely homogeneous.
 62
 
 Finally, the realism of our fears of express or tacit collusion depends greatly on the 
degree of product differentiation in a market.  The great majority of instances of market-wide 
collusion occur in markets for commodities or relatively undifferentiated products.
63
  As has 
been well known for decades, market-wide collusion is much more difficult to pull off as 
markets become more differentiated, and tacit collusion is more difficult still.
64
  The sad truth is 
that applying the HHI in a product differentiated market to test the threat of express or tacit 
collusion is doubly wrong.  First our HHI number will always be inaccurate in such a market; 
second, even if it were accurate, it would not be helpful in predicting collusion. 
V. PREDICTING PRICE EFFECTS IN DIFFERENTIATED MARKETS 
The more novel portions of the 2010 Guidelines, which are a major revision of the 
predecessor Guidelines issued in 1992, deal with unilateral effects in differentiated markets.  The 
methodologies that the Agencies use in such cases are said to be “direct” because they do not 
depend on the use of the crude surrogates for price effects that market definition and market 
concentration numbers provide.  Rather, approaches such as upward pricing pressure, assess the 
effects of a merger on the postmerger firm’s profit-maximizing price largely by reference to 
three numbers: the diversion ratio, price-cost margins of the acquired firm, and variable cost 
                                                                                                                                            
Hylton, ed. 2010); and Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 J. L. & ECON. 
241 (1996). 
61
 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
937, 955, 958 (1981) (showing extreme sensitivity of a firm’s price-cost ratios depending on firm 
elasticities of supply and demand within a given market, even when the product is fungible).  See 
also Kaplow, note __, 125 Harv.L.Rev. at 456-459. 
62
 On the range of variations, see KAI HÜSCHELRATH, COMPETITION POLICY ANALYSIS 100–01 
(2009) (showing range of price increases corresponding to a given HHI increase in markets for 
homogeneous products). 
63
 See Kaplow, supra note 53;  John M. Connor, Price-fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic 
Evidence, 22 RES. L. & ECON. 59, 136–53 (2007); JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., HOW DO 
CARTELS OPERATE?, 1 (2006). 
64
 See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 279 (3d ed. 1990) (“When products are heterogeneously differentiated, the terms 
of rivalry become multidimensional, and the coordination problem grows in complexity by leaps 
and bounds.”). 
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reductions attained through efficiencies.
65
  Importantly, as the 2010 Guidelines make clear, these 
methodologies are only one of the tools that the Agencies use to evaluate mergers and not 
necessarily the principal one. 
The logic of this approach is straightforward.  The constraints on a firm’s prices are the 
pressures posed by competitive alternatives and the costs that it faces.  As competition is 
decreased the firm’s profit-maximizing price rises; as a firm’s costs go down its profit-
maximizing price declines.  In a market that is differentiated by product variety or geography, a 
firm faces competition from a variety of other firms, but the amount of competitive pressure that 
each firm provides can vary from quite considerable to negligible.  This observation is itself as 
old as the literature on product differentiation and variegated markets,
66
 but it does not fit well 
into our conception of market definition, which requires that firms be considered either as inside 
or outside the market, with no variation in between. 
The diversion ratio expresses the competitive relationship between specific pairs of firms 
much better.  When a firm increases its price but others do not, it loses sales to rivals, but it loses 
different amounts to different rivals depending on their proximity in product or geographic 
space.  For example, firm A might lose 1000 units in response to a given price increase.  Four 
hundred of these units might go to firm B, 300 might go to firm C, 200 to firm D, and the 
remaining 100 units might go to several smaller firms.  This observation enables us to say that 
firm A’s principal competitors are B, C & D, but that B is a much closer competitors than the 
others.  If firm A were to merge with one of these firms it would “recapture” the lost diversion 
because the diverted sales would be going to its own subsidiary or division rather than to 
someone else.  The recaptured diversion would not then be a competitive pressure on the firm’s 
pricing, and it could raise the price without losing those sales.  With given costs, a firm’s profit-
maximizing price is always a tradeoff between the additional revenue per unit that a price 
increase produces and the loss of units. 
Assume that a firm with zero costs predicts that a price increase from $10.00 to $11.00 
would reduce output from 100 units to 90 units.  Total revenue (and profit) would be $1000 prior 
to the increase and $990 after, so the price increase would be unprofitable.  But suppose that the 
firm predicted that the same price increase would yield lost sales from 100 units to 92 units.  
Now total revenue and profit after the price increase would be $1012, and the price increase 
would be profitable.  In this case the recapture is of two units.  It would not matter that a 
different merger would have permitted recapture of, say, three or four units.  A merger of either 
of these two firms would change the contemplated price increase from profitable to unprofitable.  
That is to say, information about diversion ratios permits the analyst to assess the price effects of 
alternative mergers.  In general, a merger with firms that are more adjacent will facilitate a larger 
price increase. 
 
                                            
65
See Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 44; Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Recapture, Pass-Through, 
and Market Definition, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (2010). 
66
 See, e.g., EDWARD CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933); 
Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929). 
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The relevance of price-cost margins is mainly that they reflect the intensity of 
competition that is already in the market and thus the gains that can accrue from recapture of 
otherwise diverted output.  For example, under perfect competition margins are zero, and any 
price increase yields a 100% diversion.  As price-cost margins are higher, reflecting a lesser 
degree of competition, the incentive to increase prices becomes larger as well.  For example, if 
the acquired firm is earning only a tiny return on the diverted product, recapturing those gains 
will not be worth much to the acquirer.  However, if the acquired firm is earning large margins, 
the recaptured diversion will be worth more and a larger price increase would result. 
Offsetting all of this would be any merger specific efficiencies that serve to reduce the 
variable costs of the postmerger firm.  These cost reductions will decrease the profit-maximizing 
price of the postmerger firm and thus pull pricing in the opposite direction. 
Note that one might define a relevant market in this case by identifying the group of firms 
for which the diversion ratios are fairly high.  But doing this would not contribute anything to the 
analysis of pricing impact, and it could be misleading.  Under traditional formulations the merger 
analysis examines all of the firms that are thought to be “in” the market and ignores all the 
others.  Then it ranks alternative acquisitions in terms of their size rather than their proximity.  
For example, using the HHI and concentration-increasing methodology, we measure market 
concentration as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms in the market.  The HHI 
increase brought about by the merger is equal to double their product.   So a merger of a 30% 
firm and a 20% firm increases the HHI by 1200, while a merger of a 30% firm and a 10% firm 
increases the HHI by 600.
67
  That is to say, no matter how differentiated the market, the 
traditional formulation ranks mergers by size rather than proximity and does not include firms 
considered to be outside the market at all. 
To illustrate, Hyundai makes about four times as many automobiles per year as BMW.
68
  
If Mercedes and Hyundai were to merge, the HHI would indicate that the merger is much more 
threatening than if Mercedes and BMW were to merge because the HHI is extremely sensitive to 
the size of any acquired firm found to be inside the market, but not sensitive at all to the degree 
of substitution that might occur between any two particular firms that are both in the market.  
However, further inspection might reveal that in response to a price increase by Mercedes, 
enormous numbers of customers would switch to BMWs, a comparable luxury car, while few 
would switch to economy-priced Hyundai. 
One limitation on the use of direct measures such as upward pricing pressure is that the 
data for estimating substitution ratios and price cost margins must be available.  They typically 
are for mergers with large numbers of sales whose terms can be observed.  They may not be 
                                            
67
 Prior to the merger the markets shares of A and B would be expressed in the HHI as A
2
 + B
2
.  
After the merger it would be expressed as (A + B)
2
, which is A
2
 + 2AB + B
2
.  The difference is 
2AB.  See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 12.4a2. 
68
 INT’L ORG. OF MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS, WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION 
(2010), available at http://oica.net/wp-content/uploads/ranking-2010.pdf. 
Hovenkamp                                            Markets in Merger Analysis                    Aug. 2012, Page 18    
 
when the market is more idiosyncratic or lumpy or sales data are not systemically collected.
69
  In 
those cases the analyst may have to fill in some gaps, but there is no reason to think that even 
crude estimates are less reliable than the concentration-increasing methodologies employed in 
the HHI.  Indeed, as Kaplow observes, the concept of market definition has virtually no presence 
in the theoretical or empirical literature of industrial organization today.
70
  However, it continued 
to play a significant role in the 1970s and 1980s.  For example, the third edition of Frederic M. 
Scherer’s very influential Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, co-authored 
with David Ross and published in 1990, was fairly dominated by issues of market definition and 
market structure.
71
  As a result Scherer and Ross continue to be cited regularly in the legal 
literature on antitrust even though they have largely been forgotten in the current industrial 
organization literature.
72
 
Finally, approaches such as upward pricing pressure are not myopically intended to query 
whether a merger “eliminates competition” between the merging firms—every merger does 
that.
73
  Rather, they are intended to determine whether a merger will likely permit a price 
increase among two firms—precisely the purpose of market analysis in merger cases.  That other 
nearby competitors may benefit from this price increase by raising their own prices is relevant to 
our analysis of merger harm, but one certainly cannot cite Brown Shoe for the proposition that 
only mergers that cause market wide price increases fall within section 7.  The harm that the 
Supreme Court found in that case was that the merger benefited the postmerger firm by harming 
nonmerging rivals in the same market. 
VI. MARKETS AND FIRMS IN MOTION 
 Market definition approaches are always inaccurate, but they have been tweaked in ways 
that permit them to take different types of supply responses into account.  For example, in 
considering collusion-facilitating markets under traditional market structure analysis, we 
examine not only current shares but also such things as excess capacity, barriers to entry or 
mobility or other types of “supply responses” that affect the ability of firms that are not party to 
the merger to reposition their offerings.  If such repositioning is costless and quick, then the 
postmerger firm will be unable to increase its price even though “current” market shares indicate 
otherwise.  All versions of the Merger Guidelines since 1982 have been sensitive to this problem 
of supply response. 
                                            
69
 See Farrell & Shapiro, supra note  44, who observe that both price-cost margins and diversion 
ratios can typically be estimated from information disclosed during premerger reporting or 
litigation-related discovery. 
70
 Kaplow, supra note 44, at 458.  See also Franklin M. Fisher, Economic Analysis and “Bright-
Line” Tests, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 129, 132 (2008); Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, 
Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1080 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell eds., 2007). 
71
 SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 64, at chs. 3–11. 
72
 A Westlaw search of legal journal articles published since 2000 reveals some 250 articles that 
cite Scherer and Ross.  JLR database, search conducted Oct. 15, 2011). 
73
 See Keyte & Schwartz, supra note 45, at 589 (making this argument). 
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 In contrast, the direct measurement formulas for product diversion present short-run 
“snapshots,” that gauge immediate pricing pressures much more accurately than traditional 
structural analysis does.  However, when used myopically they exaggerate the impact of a 
merger to the extent that they ignore or underestimate the extent to which nonmerging firms can 
reposition themselves in order to profit from the postmerger firm’s output reduction. 
The result can be adjusted, however, to take into account situations in which such 
repositioning is likely to occur.  The 2010 Guidelines acknowledge precisely that, stating: 
A merger is unlikely to generate substantial unilateral price increases if non-merging 
parties offer very close substitutes for the products offered by the merging firms. In some 
cases, non-merging firms may be able to reposition their products to offer close 
substitutes for the products offered by the merging firms. Repositioning is a supply-side 
response that is evaluated much like entry, with consideration given to timeliness, 
likelihood, and sufficiency.
74
 
Merger analysis under such an approach is fundamentally a two-stage inquiry.  First one 
looks at the expected price impact of the proposed merger based on present product and 
geographic conditions.  Second, one must consider the likelihood and effect of the responses that 
nonmerging firms are likely to make, with the likelihood question determined by profitability.  
The repositioning analysis becomes more important as the postmerger price increase is larger or 
the costs of repositioning are lower.  If firms share common technologies, intellectual property 
protection for particular product configurations is not substantial, and other asset-specific 
investments to reconfiguration are not too large, repositioning is more likely to occur.  In that 
case the nonmerging rival must be able to predict that it can recover the costs of such 
reconfiguration in a reasonable length of time.  As the 2010 Guidelines indicate, however, all of 
these issues are within the range of queries that is well established in the analysis of postmerger 
entry or product reconfiguration by existing firms.  The analysis requires the Agency to place 
itself in the position of manager of a rival to the merging firms, querying whether a product 
redesign or deployment of a new product would be profitable given the price increase exacted by 
the postmerger firm. 
This analysis need not be either as speculative or as detailed as the analysis of new entry, 
particularly when the technological “base” is similar.  For example, to borrow some facts from 
the du Pont cellophane case,
75
 if a merger were to occur between cellophane and glassine, which 
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 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 6.0 & ex. 19.  The 1992 Guidelines provided less detail but 
said largely the same thing: 
 
Substantial unilateral price elevation in a market for differentiated products requires that 
there be a significant share of sales in the market accounted for by consumers who regard 
the products of the merging firms as their first and second choices, and that repositioning of 
the non-parties' product lines to replace the localized competition lost through the merger 
be unlikely. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §2.21 (1992) 
(emphasis added). 
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are quite similar products using equivalent technologies, the producer of an alternative flexible 
wrapping material such as aluminum foil might contemplate repositioning itself.  But to the 
extent that the raw materials and technology needed to produce aluminum foil differ a great deal 
from those used to produce cellophane or glassine, the reconfiguration query would come closer 
to resembling a query about new entry rather than a minor product variation.
76
  By contrast, if the 
cellophane producer acquired the aluminum foil producer and the feared price increase was in 
cellophane, then the glassine company might be able to reposition itself into the cellophane 
market much more cheaply and with fewer asset-specific investments.  As in the case of 
traditional entry barrier analysis, these are largely questions about engineering, asset specificity, 
and the cost of developing new productive assets, and the extent to which intellectual property 
rights might limit the ability of a firm to reconfigure part of its production into different space.  
VII. Conclusion 
 The 2010 Guidelines represent a pronounced improvement in our ability to predict the 
consequences of mergers on the one thing that antitrust policy cares about most, namely, 
consumer welfare as measured by price and output.  That has required the development of new 
methodologies, which is something that the Supreme Court expressly contemplated in Brown 
Shoe.
77
  While the 2010 Guidelines have not been very explicit about the technical 
methodologies that will be employed, the lack of specificity is probably a good thing.  First, it 
means that the 2010 Guidelines will be much less likely to be wed to a methodology that may 
soon become obsolete.  Second, lack of guidance is not a problem because government and 
academic economists write heavily in the area, and both sides in the typical challenged merger 
case have the resources to engage expert analysts.  Ultimately, however, prediction of harmful 
price increases is the dog, and market definition but the tail.  
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 Not quite perhaps, because the firm is already there and at least some of the equipment and 
employees could be used in both. 
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Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320–21 (1962). See discussion supra text at 
note___. 
